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INTRODUCTION
he international network of tax treaties is extensive and
thriving. Their copiousness is often presented as living
proof not only of their success but also of their desirability. This
article, however, argues that the treaties project, which focuses
on alleviating double taxation through the allocation of tax rev-
enues, is a missed opportunity. Indeed, the network design of
the treaties project could have served as a platform for establish-
ing a standard for a more just and efficient international tax re-
gime. Instead, the treaties became an effective mechanism for
bolstering developed countries’ market dominance, thereby im-
peding global justice. At the same time, the treaties were not as
successful in actually honing in on the inconsistencies between
the tax systems of different countries and instead often in-
creased the ability of taxpayers to avoid taxes by using tax plan-
ning. In focusing on the allocation of tax revenues, this project
* I would like to thank Eduardo Baistrocci, Talia Fisher, Mindy Hertzfeld,
the participants of The Future of Tax Treaties Conference, held at Brooklyn
Law School on October 23, 2015, and the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of
International Law for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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has been a step in the wrong direction, to the point that it has
arguably become a part of the problems associated with the de-
centralized regime of international taxation, rather than offer-
ing a solution to those problems. Specifically, the tax treaties
network has helped developed countries set a standard that re-
gressively allocates tax revenues to their own benefit.
A different standard could have established an international
tax regime that is both more just and efficient. A standard that
better curtails arbitrage opportunities, fosters transparency,
and limits free-riding and its imposition of negative externalities
on neighboring countries could cut transaction costs and de-
crease market failures, thereby reducing the inefficiencies of the
international tax market. Such a standard could promote effi-
ciency as well as improve the justice of the international tax re-
gime.
An international tax standard is a network product.1 Similar
to telecommunication networks—where the value of a telephone
or a fax machine purchased increases with every added user—
such a standard becomes more attractive the greater the number
of users that apply it.2 Beyond promoting mutual interests
through cooperation, it provides an inherent incentive for users
to join and stay in an existing network. If other consumers are
using, for example, a certain word processing software, or a sys-
tem of automatic bank machines, there is an incentive for new
users to use it. By joining or staying in a network, users benefit
from compatibility with other users. The benefits of compatibil-
ity with other countries’ tax systems facilitate conversion, as
1. The first use of network theory for the analysis of international taxa-
tion appeared in scholarship by Eduardo A. Baistrocchi. Baistrocchi uses a
dynamic theory, explaining what he describes as “the creeping convergence of
the BRIC world” with the international tax regime, through a two-sided plat-
form network theory. See Eduardo A. Baistrocchi, The International Tax Re-
gime and the BRIC World: Elements for a Theory, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
733, 733 (2013).
2. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
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they may outweigh preferences for features of other noncompat-
ible systems.3 Thus, even if certain countries prefer the charac-
teristics of another system4 to those of the network’s standard,
the fact that many other countries are using the less favored
standard will often be determinative. Due to these internal in-
centives, a standardized regime could evolve and thrive, even in
the current decentralized and competitive international tax
arena, despite the absence of an official enforcing authority.
The advantages of self-enforced stability, however, are not
without costs. First, once a network—such as the tax treaties
network—is established, it is difficult to have its users shift to a
different standard, even if it is superior. Second, initiators could
exploit the network by extracting cartelistic gains against poten-
tial competitors and monopolistic rents from its consumers. Both
of these problems are manifested in the international tax trea-
ties network. It has locked in an inferior standard as well as al-
lowed its initiators—i.e., developed countries—to disproportion-
ately benefit from it at the expense of other users—i.e., develop-
ing countries—and, potentially, taxpayers.
Consequently, the question that arises is: Can an interna-
tional tax network be developed that is based on an efficient and
just standard? This article does not offer a conclusive answer to
this question. Instead, it explains that an efficient and just
standard can be developed if some actors that have the capacity
to establish a leading group that would redefine the interna-
tional tax arena and start anew with an entirely new mecha-
nism—one that facilitates state competition rather than focuses
on the allocation of tax revenues. Ideally, such a standard would
create a new set of network externalities to make it worthwhile
for countries to join. Introducing a new network that establishes
a standard that streamlines competition could eventually allow
individual countries to exit the existing treaty mechanism, but
still benefit from network externalities. Several issues make the
evolvement of such a standard doubtful, however, including: the
3. Pasquale Pistone, Tax Treaties with Developing Countries: A Plea for
New Allocation Rules and a Combined Legal and Economic Approach, in TAX
TREATIES: BUILDINGBRIDGESBETWEEN LAW ANDECONOMICS 413 (Michael Lang
et al. eds., 2010) (suggesting that the soft law nature of the OECD Model sup-
ports its “silent diffusion” around the world).
4. Some preferences may include a particular definition for “permanent es-
tablishment” that triggers local taxation of business income and certain bank
secrecy rules, which limit the ability to collect tax information.
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strong interests of developed countries in preventing tax compe-
tition, along with the fact that they seem to be the first movers
(again) by initiating the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting accord
(BEPS), and the collective action problems that appear to plague
developing countries more than developed countries.
Part I of the article will briefly describe the current framework
and problems of the international tax regime. Specifically, this
Part will examine the coordination problems stemming from the
international tax regime’s decentralized structure, and the ex-
tensive network of tax treaties that was established in response
to some of these problems. This network, which was allegedly
set up to benefit all contracting countries, in practice has mostly
benefited countries of residence. Part II will focus on the stream-
lining solution: it will explain how standardization of the main
building blocks of international taxation could improve both the
efficiency and justice of the international tax regime by allowing
individual countries to competitively set the public goods and
services they provide and their pricing. It will further explain
what makes such a standard a network product, as well as illus-
trate how the network design of an international tax regime
could help establish such a standardized solution. Finally, Part
III will discuss why the current standard of tax treaties follow-
ing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) model has failed to provide a just and efficient in-
ternational tax network, and will consider potential ways of us-
ing the network features of the standard in order to arrive at an
improved international tax regime (while at the same time sow-
ing the seeds of its potential failure).
I. THE PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION REGIME
In the decentralized international tax market, each country
makes its own tax rules. Consequently, there tends to be great
divergence across countries in the specifics of their systems. De-
spite considerable conversion between the policies of different
countries,5 the differences between the various international tax
systems remain substantial, and not only in regards to tax rates.
Specifically, regimes diverge in the details of their very basic
5. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 1 (2007) (arguing that there
seems to be a remarkable degree of convergence between the rules of different
countries).
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building blocks: in their definitions of the different sources of in-
come; in their criteria for determining the geographical location
of certain types of income; in their systems of alleviating double
taxation; in the ways they determine the residency of individuals
and corporations; in the deductions they allow and the taxes
they withhold; in how and whether they characterize an entity
as opaque or transparent for tax purposes; and in the rules they
use to determine the price of transactions (their transfer pricing
rules), timing issues, and exemptions. Finally, each country ap-
plies different standards for both the collection and storage of
information, as well as varying standards of enforcement.6
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the international tax
market is notorious for the diversity of problems arising from its
decentralized nature: double taxation (the uncoordinated result
of two jurisdictions imposing tax on the same economic activity);
tax avoidance (as a result of taxpayers’ jurisdiction shopping);
6. David H. Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International
Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 139
(2000). According to Rosenbloom:
The choices are plentiful, even if choices serving purposes
other than the direct tax purpose are disregarded. It would
be amazing if there was greater uniformity across national
boundaries—if countries generally defined “resident” in the
same way, or “corporation,” or “stock.” In fact, it is fairly
amazing that the taxing jurisdictions of the world, with their
diverse political and economic systems, have reached a point
of sufficient understanding in matters of law and taxation
that the concepts of “residence,” “corporation,” and “stock”
are generally comprehensible almost everywhere.
Id. at 139. For some comparative examples, see id. at 138–40.
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tax arbitrage (the result of legislative gaps between jurisdic-
tions);7 and tax evasion (often fostered by the lack of transpar-
ency of information between jurisdictions).8 All of these issues
work to undermine the efficiency of the global tax market by cre-
ating barriers to free trade, generating free-riding opportunities,
and enabling both taxpayers and states to impose negative ex-
ternalities on other states and their residents.
In addition, justice is also impaired in the international tax
market. To begin with, tax competition, as well as the gaps and
frictions between jurisdictions, undermine the ability of states
to collect tax revenues, which are used to finance their public
goods and services and pay for the welfare state. Compounding
this are the disturbing inequality gaps that exist between devel-
oped and developing countries, which the current allocation of
tax revenues among countries fails to relieve.
The international tax system could, therefore, certainly use a
standard. The urgency of this need was summarized neatly in
the recent BEPS Action Plan:9
Taxation is at the core of countries’ sovereignty, but the inter-
action of domestic tax rules in some cases leads to gaps and
frictions. When designing their domestic tax rules, sovereign
states may not sufficiently take into account the effect of other
countries’ rules. The interaction of independent sets of rules
enforced by sovereign countries creates frictions, including po-
tential double taxation for corporations operating in several
countries. It also creates gaps, in cases where corporate income
is not taxed at all, either by the country of source or the country
of residence, or is only taxed at nominal rates. In the domestic
7. See id. at 142; Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implica-
tions of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 80 (2002); Daniel
Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3
CHI. J. INT’LL. 317 (2002). Consider, for example, a transaction that is regarded
as a leasing transaction in one country (thus providing depreciation deductions
to the lessor) but a loan financing the purchase of an asset in another country
(thus providing a depreciation deduction in that other country to the les-
see/debtor).
8. Steven Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49
B.C. L. REV. 605, 605 (2008).
9. The BEPS efforts—a large-scale accord initiated by the G20, and taken
up by the OECD to curtail states’ tax base erosion through tax avoidance by
multinationals, which was seriously undermining states’ ability to collect tax
revenues—were launched with the publication of this action plan, where the
OECD described the goals of its two-year ambitious project.
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context, coherence is usually achieved through a principle of
matching—a payment that is deductible by the payer is gener-
ally taxable in the hands of the recipient, unless explicitly ex-
empted. There is no similar principle of coherence at the inter-
national level, which leaves plenty of room for arbitrage by tax-
payers.10
A standard could prevent, or at least ameliorate, these gaps and
frictions and hence curtail arbitrage opportunities.
Many initiatives have been pursued over the years to promote
cooperation among states to alleviate the problems of decentral-
ization, but none were more successful than the international
network of treaties for the prevention of double taxation—the
treaties project. More than three thousand treaties were signed
based on a common standard, the OECDModel Tax Convention,
which was created by and for developed countries, and focuses
primarily on the allocation of tax revenues among them.11 To a
certain extent, the treaties network set a standard for both the
negotiation of such treaties between contracting states and the
international tax regime, as many of the cross-border transac-
tions are governed by tax treaties.12 The common language and
structure of the tax treaties made them user-friendly for taxpay-
ers worldwide. These tax treaties reduced the costs of research-
ing the tax laws that govern investments in foreign jurisdictions,
coordinated certain tax terms,13 and set certain agreed upon tie-
breaking rules (i.e., for determining the residency of dual-resi-
dent taxpayers). In so doing, the treaties system increased tax-
payers’ level of certainty in dealing with unfamiliar foreign tax
10. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], ACTION PLAN ON BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 9 (2013) [hereinafter BEPS ACTION PLAN].
11. For an analysis of the effects of tax treaties, see Tsilly Dagan, The Tax
Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000).
12. See AVI-YONAH, supra note 5; e.g., Baistrocchi, supra note 1; Yariv
Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259
(2003). But see Rosenbloom, supra note 6, at 164–65 (stressing the electivity of
tax treaties); Alex Easson, Do We Still Need Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. INT’L.
FISCALDOC. 619 (2000).
13. For example, see the arm’s-length mechanism. See Eduardo A. Baistroc-
chi, The Structure of the Asymmetric Tax Treaty Network: Theory and Implica-
tions, BEPRESS LEGAL REPOSITORY (2006), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=9408&context=expresso.
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authorities, making it popular among states interested in at-
tracting taxpayers and their economic activities.14 It also created
some (very limited) mechanisms for the exchange of infor-
mation.15 But the treaties’ main claim to fame has been their
mechanisms for the prevention of double taxation through the
allocation of tax jurisdiction—and, accordingly, the allocation of
tax revenues—among the contracting states.16 With its slogan of
“double-taxation prevention,” the treaties’ standard provided re-
assurance for investors in foreign countries and acted as a stamp
of approval for states regarding compatibility, signifying their
membership in “the treaty club.”17 In practice, however, the trea-
ties were not really necessary for alleviating the classic double
taxation problems (i.e., those deriving from the fact that resi-
dence and host countries tax the same income). In any event,
double taxation likely would have been avoided had countries
been left to pursue their unilateral interests.18
The standard adopted by the tax treaties network, although
widespread and arguably successful, is controversial in terms of
its distributive consequences. Rather than offering any signifi-
cantly greater degree of double taxation relief, the tax treaties
often simply replicate the mechanism that participating coun-
tries use unilaterally to alleviate double taxation with one nota-
ble difference: the treaties usually allocate the tax revenues
more to the benefit of residence countries than host countries.19
For equal negotiating partner-countries, this was not a concern.
The uniformity of the tax treaties saves transaction costs for in-
vestors, without entailing any significant loss of tax revenues for
such contracting states.20 As a result, developed countries (sign-
ing treaties with either like-kind countries or with developing
countries who are predominantly source countries) had no rea-
son to not join and then remain in the network of treaties. As
expected in cases of network products, the more countries joined
14. SeeDagan, supra note 11, at 980–83; Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The
Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, in TAXDESIGN ISSUESWORLDWIDE 51 (Geerten
M.M. Michielse & Victor Thuronyi eds., 2015).
15. Dagan, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. For a detailed explanation, see id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
2016] Tax Treaties as a Network Product 1089
the network, the more popular it became21—due to the growing
prevalence of the treaties’ standard. The case for developing
countries is different, however, since, in interacting with devel-
oping countries, developed countries are predominantly resi-
dence countries, and the treaties’ standard results in a regres-
sive allocation of tax revenues between developed and develop-
ing countries. Thus, developing countries had to pay a price in
tax revenues in order to join the tax treaties network.22
Yet, as with other network products, states—even developing
states—are incentivized to join and stay in the network because
the other states increasingly apply the same standard. In fact,
developing countries joined the network, despite the possibility
of suffering a net loss of tax revenues as a consequence.23 This
behavior of developing countries can be explained by their incen-
tive to “join the club” and enjoy the compatibility of mechanisms
that offer network-type advantages of the tax treaties system.
Staying out of the network could mean that investors will bypass
the nonjoining countries in favor of countries within the net-
work, simply because the treaties offer the taxpayer-consumer
the simplicity and security of a familiar standard.24 This nicely
exemplifies how the network structure of tax treaties can foster
cooperation in situations where countries would not otherwise
be incentivized to do so.25
21. See Baistrocchi, supra note 13.
22. See Dagan, supra note 11; International Monetary Fund [IMF], Spillo-
vers in International Corporate Taxation 28–29 (IMF Policy Paper, May 9,
2014) [hereinafter IMF, Spillovers], http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf; see also Brooks & Krever, supra note 14.
23. Brooks & Krever, supra note 14.
24. Baistrocchi, supra note 13 (offering a convincing explanation for the
strategic incentive of developing states to join the network as deriving from
their concern that their competitors will join the treaties network, and thereby
win the tax competition).
25. It is intriguing as to why developing countries have not established a
competing standard—one that would be more generous toward their own
needs. The answer may be found in the asymmetries between developed and
developing countries in terms of their ability to cooperate (and thus their abil-
ity to collectively promote a standard that serves their joint interests). There
are two reasons to support developing countries’ inferiority regarding coopera-
tion. First, OECD countries have a longer tradition of cooperation, and thus
each of them is at a greater risk of reputation costs upon defection (which is
probably what enabled them to create the network platform in the first place).
Second, countries of residence, like the OECD countries, tend to compete
1090 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
Notwithstanding these cooperation-promoting advantages,
the standard established in the tax treaties, with its particular
focus on allocating tax revenues, has not proven to be very effec-
tive. In fact, it may have even been counterproductive. This ar-
ticle proposes that the reason for the lack of effectiveness is that
this standard fails to create an adequately robust regime, thus
allowing for too many gaps and frictions between the various
systems. The level of conversion of international taxation defini-
tions and concepts this standard offers seems to be insufficient
for reducing arbitrage opportunities.26 It is also not helpful in
streamlining the collection and dissemination of information,
and accordingly, in facilitating better enforcement of the rules of
international taxation.27 Looking at the current state of the co-
ordination of terms, enforcement, and transparency, treaties
simply fail to achieve these goals.28 In fact, in many cases it is
among themselves for residents, who are much less mobile and easier to detect,
rather than capital, which tends to be the source of competition among devel-
oping countries. Thus, competition among OECD countries may not be as
fierce, and the costs of cooperation may be lower. See Michael Lang & Jeffrey
P. Owens, The Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development and Protecting
the Tax Base 34 (WU Int’l Taxation Research Paper Series, No. 2014-03, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398438 (explaining that “[r]esearch has suggested
that the only way developing countries may avoid signing tax treaties is if they
act as a group, but the lack of such consensus brings them into a situation
where they have to create their own treaty network in order to become attrac-
tive for foreign investment . . . .”).
26. Under the treaty regime, there are still numerous tax planning oppor-
tunities. For example, different countries still employ different definitions for
sources of income (i.e., interest versus dividends), entities (i.e., partnership
versus limited corporation), allowable deductions, or timing of income.
27. See Dean, supra note 8 (criticizing the treaty based incomplete market
in tax information).
28. See Easson, supra note 12, at 620. According to Easson:
The creation of a network of tax treaties has been a remark-
able achievement, and the OECD Model Convention, which
is largely responsible for establishing an almost universally
accepted international tax regime, must by any standards be
considered a major success. Nevertheless, there is a growing
perception that the current international tax regime has se-
rious weaknesses. As Reuven Avi-Yonah has remarked, “the
miracle is flawed.” And, almost ten years ago, Richard Vann
argued that the OECD Model had become increasingly inef-
ficient, inflexible and irrelevant: in his words, “adoption of
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the treaty network that facilitates tax arbitrage, and thus tax
avoidance, through treaty shopping—where taxpayers use enti-
ties located in treaty countries in order to channel income to tax
havens.29More significantly, the current standard is counterpro-
ductive in promoting a just and efficient tax regime because it
regressively distributes tax revenues by favoring developed
countries.30 Even if this standard were to be improved to enable
states to effectively impose their tax laws and thereby redistrib-
ute income domestically, the standard’s regressivity towards de-
veloping countries would still raise serious doubts about its nor-
mative desirability.31
In sum, the tax treaties network, which is the basis of the cur-
rent international tax regime, suffers from critical efficiency and
justice problems. The transaction costs, enforcement challenges,
arbitrage opportunities, and domestic and global injustices im-
posed by (or not prevented by) the current standard, all seem to
collectively burden both participating states and taxpayers.
II. A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TAX
MARKET
As the deficiencies of the current international tax regime in-
dicate, the market of international taxation could benefit from a
better standard. The BEPS Action Plan is also clear on this is-
sue:
Inaction in this area would likely result in some governments
losing corporate tax revenue, the emergence of competing sets
of international standards, and the replacement of the current
consensus-based framework by unilateral measures, which
the OECD Model as the solution to international tax prob-
lems is a concept whose time has come – and gone.” As John
Avery Jones stated in his 1997 David R. Tillinghast Lecture,
the disadvantage of the treaty route is that it is self-perpetu-
ating: “treaties are a one-way street; they lead only to more
treaties.”
Id. at 620.
29. For an example, see IMF, Spillovers, supra note 22, at 2.
30. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 11; Brooks & Krever, supra note 14.
31. For a discussion of the issues of global justice such allocation entails, see
Tsilly Dagan, International Tax Policy: Between Competition and Cooperation
(forthcoming 2017).
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could lead to global tax chaos marked by the massive re-emer-
gence of double taxation. In fact, if the Action Plan fails to de-
velop effective solutions in a timely manner, some countries
may be persuaded to take unilateral action for protecting their
tax base, resulting in avoidable uncertainty and unrelieved
double taxation.32
Specifically, there is a need for more standardization in the in-
ternational tax regime, which would streamline the system by
regulating the basic building blocks of international taxation
and facilitating enforcement. As a general matter, a standard-
ized international tax regime—i.e., one that sets the rules of the
game by determining who, what, where, when, and how much
taxes are owed—could potentially reduce transaction costs and
curtail negative externalities and free riding. Thus, a carefully
designed standard could increase the efficiency of the interna-
tional tax market.33
Significantly, standardization could enhance the regime, irre-
spective of the harmonization versus tax competition contro-
versy. Whereas harmonization is aimed at curtailing tax compe-
tition so that countries can collect enough taxes to fund their
welfare state, the standard this article envisions would stream-
line the tax regime and allow each country to freely (and effi-
ciently) determine its own tax rates and packages of public ser-
vices—thereby facilitating fiscal competition, while minimizing
the costs of that competition. A standardized international tax
regime would not (or at least not necessarily) set a barrier to tax
competition. On the contrary, the new standard could—indeed
should—organize the rules of the competing jurisdictions to fos-
ter more efficient competition among them and would direct its
focus on the quality of public services provided and the “price”34
paid for them. Countries would still be able to offer a variety of
32. See, e.g., BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 10–11.
33. The exact contours of this standard are debatable. See, e.g., Shaviro, su-
pra note 7, at 22–23 (stressing the lack of a consensus and clear reference point
akin to international trade, and suggesting that an international tax organiza-
tion will—in lieu of creating a worldwide tax base uniformity—aim at coordi-
nating cooperation where transaction costs impede mutually advantageous
policies, such as eliminating cross-border tax arbitrages, and reining in coun-
tries’ occasional inclination to adopt narrow definitions of foreign source in-
come—in order to reduce credits for foreign taxes and information gathering).
34. For example, the level of taxes.
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“baskets” of public services for different prices. Hence, even a
standardized international tax market could conceivably leave
plenty of room for heterogeneity.
A streamlining standard—as opposed to a harmonizing re-
gime—could better determine source and residency rules. It
could also set a uniform formula for determining transfer prices,
incorporate anti-abuse arrangements, and coordinate the rules
on flow-through and opaque entities. Detailed mechanisms and
technological compatibility could be set for the collection and dis-
semination of information among enforcement agencies35 and
could facilitate mutual assistance. Moreover, a standard
adopted by a large enough number of states could reduce market
inefficiencies, transaction costs, and negative externalities, and
increase transparency. Such a standard would lower the costs
for taxpayers contemplating investing in foreign countries, as it
would require less investment in deciphering the rules of foreign
jurisdictions. This standard would also limit arbitrage opportu-
nities by narrowing the gaps between the rules of different juris-
dictions. This would reduce taxpayers’ incentive to invest in tax
planning, and would prevent them from free riding on the public
services of certain jurisdictions, while also evading their taxes.
Standardization would also counter externalities by preventing
countries from using creative definitions to enable foreign inves-
tors to free ride in their home jurisdictions. Lastly, sharing in-
formation and standardizing its modes of storage globally would
enable states to be more effective in collecting taxes. Overall,
therefore, a standardized regime would lead to greater efficiency
in the international taxation market and lower transaction costs
for both taxpayers and enforcement agencies, as well as prevent
market failures, such as lack of transparency and negative ex-
ternalities.
Since a standardized international tax regime would allow
states to more effectively impose and collect taxes, competition
among states for residents and investors would be based on the
prices that best reflect the level and quality of their public goods
and services. Justice would also be promoted by a standardized
regime. Currently, the taxpayers who benefit most from the de-
centralized regime, and the ample planning opportunities it of-
35. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Net-
work Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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fers, are capital owners who can most easily engage in tax plan-
ning to minimize their combined global tax burden. Other tax-
payers (e.g., labor), who cannot take advantage of the arbitrage
opportunities as their sources of income, are usually more
tightly connected to a certain location and their tax liability is,
consequently, easily enforced. Most importantly, an improved
standard could prevent the regressive redistribution produced
by the current standard by either applying a fairer allocation of
tax revenues between residence and host countries or, prefera-
bly, by simply facilitating tax competition, which could promote
both efficiency and justice.36
But could such a standard emerge in the current decentralized
international tax regime? There are some valid reasons to be-
lieve that it could, the most prominent being that this standard
would be a network product. As such, it would bear the unique
quality of facilitating conversion, even given differing domestic
preferences. Furthermore, as is characteristic of any network
product, its value would increase with both the increase in the
number of its users and extent of its use. Accordingly, once it has
been established, such a network would tend to spread and rein-
force itself because, the more countries that join it, the more val-
uable it becomes. One way to develop such a standard is through
cooperation. The BEPS Action Plan assumes consensus is criti-
cal in this regard.37However, although cooperation can certainly
36. See Tsilly Dagan, Just Harmonization, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 331 (2010); Da-
gan, supra note 31.
37. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 1. The BEPS Action Plan states:
In fact, if the Action Plan fails to develop effective solutions
in a timely manner, some countries may be persuaded to take
unilateral action for protecting their tax base, resulting in
avoidable uncertainty and unrelieved double taxation. It is
therefore critical that governments achieve consensus on ac-
tions that would deal with the above weaknesses. As the G20
Leaders pointed out, “Despite the challenges we all face do-
mestically, we have agreed that multilateralism is of even
greater importance in the current climate, and remains our
best asset to resolve the global economy’s difficulties[.]”
Id. (citation omitted).
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help achieve a viable standard, it is important to note that com-
petition between differing standards may also lead to the emer-
gence of a dominant and viable one.38
As the BEPS Action Plan indicates, at least for countries suf-
fering from the problems of tax arbitrage, free riding, and poor
enforcement, there is good reason to establish such a standard-
ized regime, which, if adopted, would render significant benefits
for those states.39 Even if individual countries have specific rule
preferences, the network effect of the standard—namely, offer-
ing members’ compatibility with other systems—could offset the
advantages of other rules. Thus, it is quite feasible that a critical
mass of participating states would consolidate to establish such
a standard, which would subsequently gain prevalence due to
the network effect. Of course, disputes among the initiators are
likely, and there is always a potential for the evolvement of com-
peting standards.40 The challenge of negotiating a joint standard
38. See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete:
Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at
117.
39. See BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 13. According to the BEPS
Action Plan:
New international standards must be designed to ensure the
coherence of corporate income taxation at the international
level. BEPS issues may arise directly from the existence of
loopholes, as well as gaps, frictions or mismatches in the in-
teraction of countries’ domestic tax laws. These types of is-
sues generally have not been dealt with by OECD standards
or bilateral treaty provisions. There is a need to complement
existing standards that are designed to prevent double taxa-
tion with instruments that prevent double non-taxation in ar-
eas previously not covered by international standards and
that address cases of no or low taxation associated with prac-
tices that artificially segregate taxable income from the ac-
tivities that generate it. Moreover, governments must con-
tinue to work together to tackle harmful tax practices and
aggressive tax planning.
Id.
40. Thus, for example, an EU-initiated standard may challenge that offered
by the OECD.
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is significant, but the payoffs are considerable, since the stand-
ard that would end up winning would most likely take over the
entire market.41
But what would make such an international tax standard a
network product—i.e., why would its value to its users increase
as more countries adopt it?42 When tax rules are more standard-
ized, less opportunities for tax arbitrage exist because taxpayers
that operate in countries that apply the standard will not be able
to “maneuver” between different definitions in a way that best
serves their interests. Hence, the more standardized the rules,
the more limited the opportunities for taxpayers to impose neg-
ative externalities through free riding on the public services of a
home jurisdiction by not paying its taxes. Moreover, enforcement
efforts would become more targeted and directed at investments
in countries not applying the standard. A standardized regime
41. For an analysis of the decision of market players to compete for a stand-
ard versus competing within a standard, see, e.g., Besen & Farrell, supra note
38, at 120. According to Besen and Farrell:
A fundamental question for firms facing horizontal competi-
tion in a network market, therefore, is whether inter-tech-
nology competition to become the standard (competition “for
the market”) will be more or less profitable than the ordinary
intra-technology competition to be expected (“within the
market”) if rivals’ products are compatible . . . . Where firms
are symmetric, these payoffs will depend on two main factors:
the skewness of returns and the sharpness of the available
competitive tactics in the two forms of competition. The more
skewed are the returns, the harder the firms will fight; and
the sharper the available tactics the more the fighting will
dissipate profits . . . . There is no general answer to the ques-
tion of whether firms will prefer competition for the poten-
tially enormous prizes under inter-technology competition, or
the more conventional competition that occurs when there
are common standards. Indeed, the same firms may choose
different strategies in different situations. For example, Phil-
lips and Sony agreed on a compact disk standard and licensed
their technology to competitors so as to avoid repeating the
VHS/Betamax standards battle, but are now entering just
such a contest to determine the new digital audio format.
Id. (citation omitted).
42. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 2.
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would also increase transparency: as more countries share their
information, more information will be collected by each country,
and if the collected information is standardized, it will be dis-
seminated more efficiently. In addition, generally, the costs of
enforcement will decline as more countries join the network.43
Lastly, a uniform standard would significantly simplify interna-
tional taxation, enabling taxpayers and their tax advisors to eas-
ily acquire expertise on how foreign jurisdictions operate, and
would help reduce transaction costs of investing overseas. A
standardized international tax system would lower the costs of
planning and making cross-border investments between partic-
ipating jurisdictions. It would also decrease the risk of double
taxation for unaware taxpayers by eliminating the trap of over-
lapping rules between different jurisdictions, for example, when
two different states both regard the same item of income as be-
ing produced within their respective jurisdiction. Thus, a stand-
ardized regime would serve both the interests of states that seek
to limit tax planning and taxpayers who do not engage in it.
Not all taxpayers and states, however, would benefit from a
standardized regime. Some might lose out because they take ad-
vantage of the current system’s arbitrage, avoidance, and eva-
sion opportunities. With the increase in the number of countries
adopting the standard, the loopholes and arbitrage opportuni-
ties would both diminish and become more conspicuous. Gradu-
ally, regimes not applying the standard would be red flagged.
Home countries would then be able to concentrate their enforce-
ment efforts on their residents investing in these jurisdictions
and on the activities of residents of such red-flagged jurisdictions
within their borders.
Thus, a standardized international tax regime might not be in
the interests of countries (call them for our purposes “tax ha-
vens”) that reap extra benefits by offering taxpayers planning
and arbitrage opportunities and weak enforcement. If, for exam-
ple, a country could enable foreign investors to reduce their tax
burdens in their home countries—by offering differing defini-
tions,44 collecting and finding creative ways to pay back taxes
43. The same enforcement mechanisms—investigators, computing services
and programs, databases, etc.,—can serve a larger number of states, thus re-
ducing the costs for each country.
44. Thus, for example, differing definitions of corporate residency may es-
tablish foreign residency, differing definitions of debt and equity can transform
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that would be credited in countries of residence,45 or refusing to
share information with other countries—it might attract more
investments and more residents (or simply collect greater “toll
charges” for its tax-haven services). The incentive for such coun-
tries to refrain from joining the network, therefore, increases as
more countries join; as the number of countries that choose not
to join declines, competing against the standard becomes more
rewarding than competing within it. Thus, while some countries
would benefit by adopting the standard, others could benefit by
avoiding the standard. Consequently, a parallel regime of
nonnetwork countries that thrive on assisting tax avoiders could
be expected to emerge. Whether the standard or the nonstand-
ard norm prevails is a big question. But, assuming there is a
critical mass of countries who join the standard, they could use
the fact that other countries do not use it to their advantage: the
fact that a taxpayer resides or invests in a nonstandard country
could help them flag out potential tax avoiders, and thus single
out “lemons.”
An effective network would ideally be able to distinguish be-
tween “good” and “bad” regimes based simply on whether or not
they apply the standard. Arguably, countries with an incentive
to exit the network are more likely to be tax havens. Thus, an
effective network could curtail free riding and arbitrage oppor-
tunities simply by effectively punishing the residents and inves-
tors in nonnetwork countries. For example, some punishments
could include: imposing differing tax rates; disallowing their
taxes for credit purposes; blacklisting investors and residents of
nonnetwork countries; and scrutinizing the tax returns of their
dividend income into interest and vice versa, differing definitions of what con-
stitutes royalties and what are the products of a sale of intellectual property
may convert regular income into capital gains, differences in definitions can
cause a transaction to be viewed as a sale of property in one country and as a
lease in another, and differing definitions of what constitutes a corporation and
a partnership can allow for the flow through of income and deductions. For
more detailed examples of tax planning opportunities, see Rosenbloom, supra
note 6; Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 706
(2011); Tsilly Dagan, Pay as You Wish: Globalization, Forum Shopping, and
Distributive Justice (June 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457212.
45. For some examples, see Charles I. Kingson, The David Tillinghast Lec-
ture Taxing the Future, 51 TAX L. REV. 641 (1996).
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residents and investors. Under such a scenario, at least theoret-
ically, and assuming that a critical mass of countries adopt a
streamlining standard for international taxation, the prospects
of its expansion and sustainability are quite promising.46 But a
question nonetheless exists: Why has the tax treaties network
not evolved to provide such a solution?
III. CAN A BETTER STANDARD EVOLVE?
Despite the potential for the emergence of a desirable interna-
tional tax standard through mass adoption of the tax treaties
network mechanism, such a standard did not evolve, and the
network’s product is far from ideal. This article suggests that the
reason for the inadequacy of the current standard is that the
current network suffers from problems that are typical of net-
work industries: it facilitates cartel building and creates a bar-
rier to the emergence of competing, and potentially better, net-
works.
A. Cartel Building
One of the greatest assets of network structures is their stabil-
ity, due to their ability to provide incentives for members to co-
operate. These incentives, however, are also the source of a cen-
tral problem of network structures: the emergence of cartels and
the extraction of monopolistic rents.47 The benefits of the net-
work—the “treaty club”—not only incentivize states to join the
network, but also serve as an effective sanction against defec-
tors. Thus, even when a network’s standard confers excessive
benefits on the network originators,48 latecomers might never-
theless adopt it for the simple reason that operating outside of
the network might be even more costly.
The network’s power to facilitate cartel building can explain
both the extra benefits enjoyed by developed countries and the
46. See Baistrocchi, supra note 1 (describing the evolution of the current tax
treaties regime and the incentive it arguably provided for Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (“BRICS”) to join).
47. Tyler Cowen, Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy, 8 ECON.
& PHIL. 249, 253, 255 (1992) (“The same factors that allow anarchy to be stable
may also allow the . . . agencies to exercise monopoly power to collude . . . com-
peting legal systems are either unstable or collapse into a monopoly agency or
network.”).
48. Another situation imposes excessively high costs on newer participants.
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fact that developing countries join and remain in the network,
despite the limited benefits they derive from the specific ar-
rangements and the excessive prices they must pay in tax reve-
nues.49 If successful, this may also be the mechanism that ena-
bles states to impose monopolistically high taxes on their tax-
payers, who lack any realistic opportunity to opt for a nonnet-
work tax jurisdiction.50
In other words, the tax treaties regime allows residence coun-
tries—the network originators—to extract cartelistic profits.
This correlates with the first-mover advantage that is character-
istic of networks, where the first to establish its product as a
standard reaps a considerable gain.51 The fact that the tax trea-
ties model was designed by and for developed countries gave
them such a first-mover advantage. Whether the standard was
thus purposely designed or provided them with considerable
benefits coincidentally is beside the point. What is significant is
that once the path of lowering hosts’ tax revenues at source
(hence, allowing countries of residence to collect higher taxes)
was embarked on, there was little chance of developed countries
turning back. The first developed countries to join the network
enjoyed the gains of simplification and reduction of transaction
costs. The uniform standard they created offered network exter-
nalities for all states using the standard by further reducing the
transaction costs of negotiating the treaties, and in simplifying
the interaction with foreign tax jurisdictions for residents and
investors involved in cross-border transactions. Once the net-
work dominated the international tax market, developed coun-
tries were able to extract monopolistic rents from developing
countries joining the system. Unlike developed countries, devel-
oping countries have had to pay a price in lost tax revenues in
order to join the treaty club.52 Hence, their gain from the net-
work, if any, is much smaller comparatively than developed
countries. Although developing countries might be expected to
49. See Baistrocchi, supra note 13.
50. If, for example, the new BEPS treaty mechanism is successful in enforc-
ing a “single tax” regime, countries may be able to raise their tax rates.
51. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 35, at 495.
52. In reality, the seemingly symmetrical structure pushed source countries
to surrender tax revenues, allegedly for increased cross-border investments re-
sulting from the prevention of double taxation. Since double taxation would
have probably been prevented, even in the absence of tax treaties, such reduc-
tion in tax revenues is a sheer loss for countries of source. For an elaborate
explanation of this argument, see Dagan, supra note 11.
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avoid the network (or at least not join it), they apparently find
this hard to do because of their fear of being left out of the treaty
club. The alternative of operating outside of the network could
conceivably cost them more than using it; that is, if foreign in-
vestors prefer investing in a treaty country to investment in a
non-treaty country—the developing country may lose much de-
sired foreign investments.
B. The Lock-In Effect
It is quite clear why an individual country might have diffi-
culty exiting a network if residents and investors prefer treaty
to non-treaty countries. An individual country that takes an in-
dependent position and refuses to sign model-style treaties is
singled out, which could cause investors to choose investing in
other, more conformist countries. Thus, while host countries
might have preferred a different solution—one that would either
promote cross-border investments or distribute tax revenues in
a way that is more beneficial to them—taking an independent
position would impose significant costs on that country. But,
since tax treaties—though extremely popular—are far from
flawless (i.e., incomplete scopes, partial solutions, and problem-
atic distributive results), why has a competing standard not
evolved?
Arguably, the current standard would be easy to fix, either by
updating the tax treaties’ model and having states revise their
treaties accordingly, or by establishing a competing—and im-
proved—standard. A better standard would cover more basis in
terms of streamlining the regulated regimes and adopt terms
that treat states more equally. Although either updating or es-
tablishing a new standard could be a viable solution, the net-
work structure of treaties creates inherent barriers to such
change. In particular, the lock-in effect of networks makes a
spontaneous shift to an alternative standard unlikely. The costs
involved in converting the entire treaty network to the new
standard are high, and the interests involved are such that the
current powerful supporters of the standard will be reluctant to
change. The recent alteration to the OECD Model opened the
door for non-OECD countries to contribute their insights on the
model’s desirable orientation, and could represent a shift away
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from the current standard.53 Turning around the huge and quite
stable ship that is the treaties network to pursue new goals,
however, would be very hard to do,54 especially given that the
dominant members would strive to preserve their favorable po-
sition.55
53. As Yariv Brauner describes it,
the emerging economies—particularly China, India, and Bra-
zil—have taken a more active role in the shaping of the inter-
national tax regime, despite not being OECD members. This
has resulted in a reversal of the trend towards maximizing
residence taxation mentioned above. Recent years have been
marked by the OECD’s attempts to increasingly permit
source taxation. There is some controversy over the exact
drivers, motivations, and magnitude of this reversal of trend,
yet there should be little debate about its direction and the
importance of the actions by the abovementioned countries to
effectuate it.
Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 64 (2014).
54. Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?, 45
BULL. INT’LFISC. DOC. 99, 103 (1991). Richard J. Vann is pessimistic about this
option:
Although it is possible to refine the actual terms of the OECD
Model and to elaborate the commentary so as to cover new
cases as they arise, the time has passed for radical revision
within the current bilateral framework. In a sense the oppor-
tunity to go in another direction was lost before the 1963
draft appeared. The failure to adopt any new approach to in-
ternational tax after the Second World War (compared to
trade law and the international monetary system) meant
that effectively the solution adopted after the First World
War continued by default. In other words the OECDModel is
the culmination of 50 years of development, rather than a
new departure.
Id.
55. As an example, see the explicit statement in BEPS Action Plan, which
notes:
In the changing international tax environment, a number of
countries have expressed a concern about how international
standards on which bilateral tax treaties are based allocate
taxing rights between source and residence States. This Ac-
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Establishing a competing network—anchored on a more com-
prehensive standard that curtails tax arbitrage opportunities,
facilitates transparency, and, optimally, more justly distributes
tax revenues among countries56—might also be impossible be-
cause successful networks have a tendency to crowd out novel
standards, even if improved. Competing standards have, in fact,
been proposed in the past, the most famous being the U.N. Model
treaty, which treats developing countries more favorably than
the OECD Model does.57 The new BEPS Action Plan and reports
seem to make a considerable effort in preventing tax planning
but not in reallocating the tax revenues arising from the treaty
network. These proposals, however, failed to gain as much sup-
port as the OECD standard.58 Once again, an explanation could
be the lock-in effect: when a dominant network exists, there is
an inclination to join and stay in it—to prefer it over other, less
dominant, even if evolving networks, at least until a critical
mass of states join the latter.59
tion Plan is focused on addressing BEPS. While actions to ad-
dress BEPS will restore both source and residence taxation
in a number of cases where cross-border income would other-
wise go untaxed or would be taxed at very low rates, these
actions are not directly aimed at changing the existing inter-
national standards on the allocation of taxing rights on cross-
border income.
BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 11.
56. For a suggestion that BRICS countries cooperate along these lines, see
Tsilly Dagan, BRICS: Theoretical Framework and the Potential of Cooperation,
in BRICS AND THEEMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAXCOORDINATION 15 (Yariv
Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
57. For a detailed comparison between the two, see MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATIONCONVENTIONBETWEENDEVELOPEDANDDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES (U.N.
DEP’TOFECON. &SOC. AFFAIRS 2011); see, e.g., Michael Lennard, The UNModel
Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – Current
Points of Difference and Recent Developments, 15 ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 4, 4–11
(2009).
58. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, The BRICS and the Future
of International Taxation, in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
TAX COORDINATION 495 (Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015).
59. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 35, at 497 (“[T]he rational consumer
might well choose to wait until an alternative had been adopted by others who
incurred the costs of shifting to the new standard but reaped fewer benefits
relative to later adopters.”).
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The solution, therefore, may be to redefine the parameters of
the arena and start anew with an entirely new mechanism, one
that provides a new set of network externalities to make it
worthwhile for countries to join. Creating a new club60 that es-
tablishes a standard tailored to a competition-enhancing mech-
anism could eventually enable individual countries to abandon
the treaty mechanism, without paying the price of being ex-
cluded from a “club.” The network externalities provided by the
alternative regime may be enough to provide compatibility. This
would require a well-orchestrated move or the leadership of a
dominant-enough country. The recent BEPS efforts could be a
step in the right direction.61 If the BEPS were to take up this
project, and assuming it is successful, the BEPS initiative could
prove to be a decisive moment in the history of international tax-
ation: as it would offer a more comprehensive standard for inter-
national tax policy. The BEPS solution, however, does not seem
to be comprehensive enough to streamline the entire interna-
tional tax regime, nor does the BEPS report pay special atten-
tion to considerations of justice. There is still hope, however, that
Action Plan 1562 will evolve into a comprehensive multilateral
instrument. Such an instrument has the potential to develop a
new and comprehensive standard.
A few words of caution, however, are in order. First, it is not
at all clear whether a standardized regime could ever be estab-
lished, or whether we are instead destined to endlessly engage
in an unstable and chaotic international tax regime. As optimis-
tic as one may be, the level of conflicting interests within and
among states could prevent the emergence of any one single
standard that is better than the shaky and unsatisfactory stand-
ard currently in place. Even if such a standard does develop,63 it
could also very well suffer—like any network product—from
60. For example, a multilateral instrument or a uniform code to be adopted
by countries that join.
61. Similarly, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act may have the same
effect (albeit limited to reporting issues). See Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason,
Exporting FATCA (N.Y. Univ. Cent. for Law, Econ., & Org., Working Paper
No. 14-05, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2389500.
62. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DEVELOPING A
MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TOMODIFYBILATERAL TAX TREATIES (2015).
63. For example, something along the lines of the BEPS multilateral initia-
tive.
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both cartel building and the lock-in effect.64 The former could
cause a tilted distribution of the gains reaped from the new net-
work between first movers and latecomers; the latter may cur-
tail the ability of the new standard to update in line with future
developments in the market economy. Moreover, even if these
gains are distributed justly among states, the cartelistic poten-
tial of the network might enable states to extract excessive mo-
nopolistic rents from their taxpayers.65 The network could, thus,
serve to curtail tax competition among countries, and since tax
competition can restrict the ability of states to collect excessive
taxes or provide unnecessary services, curbing it could impose
undue burdens on taxpayers.
Accordingly, to prevent these risks, adequate attention must
be devoted to making the alternative mechanism flexible enough
to allow for internal updating and tweaking, and to counter in-
herent cartelistic inclinations (for example, by establishing an
antitrust agency to monitor state conduct). Such measures, how-
ever, would require yet another level of cooperation among par-
ticipating countries, the likelihood of which is hard to predict.
CONCLUSION
The decentralized structure of international taxation could
greatly benefit from the creation of a network that standardizes
its rules, enhances transparency, and bolsters enforcement. The
network structure of a standardized international tax regime
could mitigate some of the negative externalities that are gener-
ated by state competition and thereby facilitate long-term coop-
eration among states. Such a network could also effectively pre-
vent defections and, therefore—in the best-case scenario—be
sustainable.
The standard envisioned here offers a promising self-enforcing
mechanism through the network externalities it produces. Yet,
it should be noted that, like any other network, it might also suf-
fer from the risk of cartel building, which enables the network
64. See Ring, supra note 7, at 171 n.303 (raising concerns regarding the col-
lateral effects of cooperation among jurisdictions creating a momentum that
would produce more harmonization than might otherwise be thought desira-
ble).
65. But see Christians et al., Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon,
14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 303 (2008) (suggesting that the OECD in fact re-
stricts states in a way that prioritizes community-wide fairness in tax policy
over competition among states).
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originators to extract monopolistic gains from latecomers as well
as taxpayers, and the lock-in effect, which obstructs the net-
work’s internal updating. This, of course, would curtail the effi-
ciency of the network standard.
